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Summary  findings
Bridging the external financing gap has been an  That investment lending commitments are related to
important factor in borrowing government's demand for  debt service payments implies that aid may be more
World Bank loans. The demand for IBRD and IDA  fungible than previously believed. If Bank lending is
lending is positively related to an increase in debt service  fungible and there is no guarantee that a particular Bank
payments and inversely related to a borrowing country's  loan is financing an identified investment project or
level of reserves.  program,  a case could be made for greater use of
These two variables explain a large part of the  programmatic lending (with well-defined conditionality).
variation in IBRD and IDA lending commitments, not  As developing countries become larger and more
only since the Asian crisis but also during tranquil times  integrated with volatile international capital markets,
over the past two decades. Borrowing to service debt  there is also likely to be a greater need for fast-
during a crisis is consistent with the Bank's role as a  disbursing, contingent program lending facilities from
lender of last resort as well as with its core development  the Bank.
objectives, but such borrowing during tranquil times may
conflict with the Bank's long term objective of reducing
poverty.
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The World Bank (the Bank, henceforth) is a major source of external finance for developing
countries. This is especially so during financial crises when access to private capital markets is greatly
reduced even for middle-income countries such as Argentina or Korea. In response to the recent Asian
crisis, for example, lending from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
rose by nearly 50 percent, from $14.6 billion during FY1996-97 to $21.6 billion in FY1998-99.'
That bridging the external financing gap was an important consideration for borrowing from the
World Bank in recent years is unquestionable.  But has this been also important historically, especially
during tranquil times?  This is the central theme of this paper.  The main finding is that the demand for
IBRD and IDA loans is positively related to an increase in debt service payments, and inversely related to
the level of reserves of a borrowing country. These two variables explain a large part of the variation in
IBRD and IDA lending commitments not only since the Asian crisis, but also during tranquil times over
the last two decades. To a lesser extent, investor confidence and global liquidity conditions-represented
by Institutional Investor country risk rating and the US interest rates respectively-are  also found to
influence the demand for IBRD lending.
Borrowing from the World Bank for servicing debt during a crisis is consistent with the Bank's
role as a lender of last resort as well as its core development objective of poverty reduction. 2 However,
such borrowing behavior during tranquil times may not be entirely consistent with the Bank's long-term
poverty reduction objective. To make a lasting impact on growth and poverty in a recipient country, Bank
loans combined with conditionality should be able to increase investment "even more than one-to-one"
l The World  Bank fiscal  year  runs  July-June.
2  The World  Bank's mission is to "fight poverty...  for lasting  results...  .by providing  resources,  sharing
knowledge,  building  capacity,  and  forging  partnerships  in the public  and  private  sectors"  (World  Bank  2000a).
2(Easterly 1999). Yet, if Bank loans are used for debt service payments, its impact on investment is almost
certain to  be less than  one-to-one.  This may in part explain Easterly's  (1999) finding that the aid-
investment relationship failed to be greater than one in 82 out of 88 aid-recipient countries during the
period 1965-95. Such borrowings also violate selectivity by  which official  assistance is allocated to
countries with good policies (Birdsall et al. 2001). Such lending may also create incentives for borrowers
to delay reforms necessary for growth and poverty reduction (Easterly 2000, Svensson 2000).
These results  also  have  some implications for  the  debate surrounding the  roles  of various
multilateral institutions. There is considerable overlap between the programs of the Bank and the IMF
(Collier 2000, p 309), despite a general consensus that the Bank (and other multilateral development
banks) should focus on long-term structural issues, leaving short-term crisis financing to the IMF. 3  If,
however, a short-term resource transfer motive has a significant influence on developing countries' desire
to borrow from the Bank, it would be difficult for the Bank to refrain from providing short-term, counter-
cyclical liquidity support, and focus exclusively on long-term structural programs.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section discusses the trends in IBRD and IDA
lending commitments, and  shows that  Bank lending commitments appear to be  correlated with debt
service payments and the level of international reserves in borrowing countries. Section 3 undertakes a
more rigorous analysis of this correlation using econometric techniques.  After a general discussion of
factors that may influence the demand of World Bank lending, this section presents empirical results on
3As  Summers  (1999)  argues,  "Going  forward  the IMF...  should  not be a source  of low-cost  financing  for
countries  with ready  access  to private  capital,  or long-term  support  for countries  that cannot break  the habit of bad
policies...  Official  estimations  of the need for external  support  need  increasingly  to move  from a predomninant  focus
on macro-economic  issues to more  clearly emphasizing  the nature  of human  needs."  The Meltzer  Commission  on
International  Financial  Institutions  also argued  that  MDBs should  stay  away from crisis-financing,  leaving  it to the
IMF  (see  Lerrick  1999).
3the relationship between external liabilities of a borrowing country and IBRD/IDA lending commitments.
The focus of the econometric analysis is on IBRD lending which constitutes the bulk of World Bank
lending.  Some preliminary results on IDA lending are also provided. The concluding section of this paper
discusses the implications of the main findings.
2. Trends in World Bank lending commitments
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was founded in 1945 with
the objective of channeling capital, on a cost pass-through basis, from international capital markets to
developing  countries  (Kapur,  Lewis  and  Webb  1997,  Gilbert  and  Vines  2000).  IBRD  lending
commitments rose from $250 million in fiscal 1947-a  loan to France for post-war reconstruction-to
$22.2 billion  in FY1999.  The International Development Association (IDA) was created in  1960 to
provide long-term (up to 40 years) concessional resources to poor developing countries that were not
considered creditworthy for the IBRD's non-concessional lending. (See World Bank 2000a for a list of
IBRD and IDA countries.) IDA lending commitments rose from $101 million in fiscal 1961 to a high of
$7.5 billion in FY1998.  During FY2000, IBRD lending commitments stood at $10.9 billion, and IDA
lending commitments at $4.4 billion.
2.1. IBRD lending
The evolution of IBRD lending volumes is marked by three distinct phases (figure 1).  The first
phase lasted until fiscal 1979 and was marked by a steady increase in investment lending to finance the
post-war reconstruction efforts. Adjustment lending was introduced in the second phase beginning in
FY1980 to address structural balance-of-payments  difficulties that emerged in many developing countries
following the oil crises of the 1970s. The third phase began in the 1990s after the resolution of the debt
crisis and the  end of the  cold  war. As  governments embraced market  economies and  embarked on
4privatization drives, there was a surge of private capital flows to developing countries. In this phase,
IBRD  lending  commitments  exhibited  volatility  around  a  rather  flat  trend  line.  IBRD  lending
commitments  rose from $14.6 billion in FY96-97 to $21.6 billion in FY98-99, but fell to $10.9 billion in
FY2000.  These fluctuations came almost entirely from adjustment loans which surpassed investment
lending for the first time in history in FY99.
The Bank has been called upon to help bridge the external resource gap in almost every crisis that
affected its borrowing members in the last half century. Such "stabilizing" or "counter-cyclical" role of
IBRD lending is evident in figure 2: IBRD lending commitments (deflated by  the GDP of low- and
middle-income countries) rose sharply during the debt crises of the 1980s, declined in the early 1990s,
and then rose sharply again during the recent Asian crisis. The trend in private non-FDI flows was exactly
the opposite during this period. 4
This resource transfer motive is also evident in the form of a high degree of correlation between
IBRD lending commitments as a share of GDP of low- and middle-income  countries and the ratio of debt
service payments 5 to international reserves in developing countries (figure 3a). Such correlation is also
present between IBRD commitments and debt service payments on long-term debt (both as share of GDP)
in figure 3b which shows a cross-section of 28 IBRD countries in 1998. We will present more analyses
of this relationship in the next section.
4 World  Bank's investment  lending  has been steadily  replaced  by private  direct investment  (FDI) flows,
while adjustment  loans-which are typically  disbursed  faster and have shorter  maturities  than investment  loan-
show  strong  counter-cyclicality  with  respect  to private  non-FDI  flows  (Dasgupta  and  Ratha  2000).
5 Debt service  payments  include  amortization  and interest  payments  on long-term  debt, and the stock of
short-term  debt (i.e, debt with  maturity  equal to or under one year). The level of international  reserves  excludes
gold.
52.2 IDA lending
The size of annual IDA lending commitments is significantly smaller than that of IBRD lending
in nominal dollar terms.  However, since most IDA countries have almost no  access to private capital
flows (Lensink and White 1998), IDA loans constitute a much larger share of the  borrowing countries'
GDP.  IDA lending is also found to be correlated with the ratio of debt service payments to reserves
(figure 4).  This is also consistent with a high correlation  (72 percent in 1997 and 55 percent in 1998,  as
noted in UNCTAD 2000, p 124) between disbursements from multilateral creditors and debt service paid
in 40-42 least developed countries.
3.  Demand for World Bank lending
Since the World Bank lends exclusively to governments (or to others with explicit government
guarantee), the demand for its lending arises from the public sector of a member country. Given the
external financing needs, a country's decision to borrow from the World Bank depends on the availability
of alternative funding from the private, bilateral and other multilateral sources, and on perceived costs and
benefits associated with World Bank loans. 6
6  Benefits  of Bank loans include favorable  borrowing  terms (low interest rates, long maturities)  and
technical  assistance. Costs  include  long loan preparation  time and policy  conditionalities.  Available  information
suggests  that  IBRD  lending  terms  are the cheapest  among  all multilateral  development  banks,  and  obviously  cheaper
than private  flows. Preparation  time, however,  is longer  in the case of World Bank loans as these may involve
environmental  safeguards  and consultations  with the civil society.  Policy conditionalities  can be perceived  as a
benefit  or a cost:  sometimes  a govermment  may  desire conditionality  to implement  politically  difficult  reforms,  or as
a  signal to attract private investment  (since private monitoring  and implementation  of conditionality  may be
unworkable,  Rodrik 1995). A country's  decision  to borrow  from the Bank may also be guided  by political  and
6In the following econometric analyses, we represent the external financing needs of the public
sector by debt service payments relative to the level of international reserves. We include debt service
payments of both public and private sectors in recognition of the government's role as a lender of last
resort.  Private banking debt, in particular short-term debt, has been frequently bailed out by governments,
because such debt carries systemic implications (World Bank 2000b, chapter 4). The use of debt service
and reserves to represent the public sector external financing gap is arguably better than using current
account balance, since the latter includes trade deficit incurred by the private sector and can be corrected,
via import compression if necessary, without significant systemic disruption. Also information on debt
service payments on outstanding debt are more readily available than that on current account deficit; thus
governments are more likely to use the former to estimate the upcoming external financing gap.
For econometric estimation,  the demand for IBRD lending is postulated as:
log(IBRD/GDP)  = cO  + c1 log((LTDS+ST)/GDP)  + C 2 log(FR/GDP)
+ C3 IIR +  c4 INT +  c5 DASIA + e  (1)
where IBRD stands for IBRD lending commitments,  LTDS stands for principal and interest payments on
long-term debt, ST for short-term debt, FR for the level of international reserves (excluding gold), IIR
indicates country risk rating  from Institutional Investor, 1NT stands for  10 year US treasury rate, and
DASIA is a dummy for the Asian crisis (which takes the value of 1 during FY1998-1999 and 0 otherwise),
and e is the error term with the standard assumptions of a least-squares regression.
The hypothesis behind this equation is that the demand for IBRD lending rises in response to an
increase in the debt service payments, and a decline in the level of international reserves.  Thus, c, > 0
and  c2 <0.
strategic  considerations  such as colonial  past and political  alliances,  conflict,  sanctions  etc.  (Polak 1991,  Alesina
and  Dollar  1998,  Rodrik  1995).
7Does this equation suffer from reverse causality by which IBRD/IDA lending may affect the
levels of debt service and international reserves?  The answer is negative.  First, usually there are time
lags between Bank lending commitments and disbursements, and even longer grace periods between
commitment, and repayment of principal and interest. 7 Secondly, as to the effect on reserves, note that
the relationship is postulated to be negative so that Bank lending does not lead to increased reserves in the
same period; instead, a decline in reserves leads to increased demand for IBRD borrowing.
The availability of private funding is represented by  the country risk rating.  An increase in
sovereign rating indicates an improvement in investor sentiment towards the borrowing country. Thus, C3
<0.
However, an improvement in investor confidence may not translate into increased private flows
to a country if the global liquidity condition happens to be tight.  We have tried to control for this by
introducing the US 10 year treasury rate: an increase in interest rates in the US signals tighter global
liquidity and discourages private flows to developing countries, which in turn may increase the demand
for IBRD lending (using the counter-cyclicality argument). Also, an increase in interest rates usually
translates into a larger increase at the short end of the yield curve than at the long end (Romer and Romer
2000).  Thus,  a  rate  increase  may  discourage  shorter  term borrowing and  encourage  longer-term
borrowing (Dasgupta and others 2000).  Since IBRD loans carry significantly longer maturities than
private loans, demand for IBRD loans may increase in response to a rate increase. By these arguments, c4
>  0. However, since IBRD operates on a cost-plus basis, a rise in the US interest rates may raise the cost
7For  this  reason,  it is arguably  better  to use lending  commitments  rather  than disbursement  or net flows  in
this equation. Also, the decision variable for the Bank's operations  is new lending commitment  rather than
disbursement  or net flow  of funds: after  lending  commitments  are made,  there  is only limited  flexibility  in varying
disbursements  from  year  to year.
8of IBRD funding, which may depress the demand for IBRD loans.  In the end, the sign of c4 is an
empirical question.
Before presenting empirical results, it is worth noting some conceptual difficulties in separating
supply factors from demand factors in the case of IBRD lending.  The IBRD intermediates funds, and
instead of maximizing profits, it charges a fixed spread over its borrowing costs. Therefore, the supply of
IBRD lending  is bounded  above by  its callable (and usable) capital  at the  aggregate level, and by
guidelines on portfolio concentration limits at the country level.  Since there has never been a call on
IBRD's  callable capital and there is  sufficient "head room" to make additional loans,  IBRD lending
commitments to  individual countries-with  the exception of a  few countries that are  near portfolio
concentration limits-are  largely demand-determined. However, because  the financial strength of the
IBRD is based in part "in the record of its borrowing members in meeting their debt-service obligations to
it" (World Bank 2000a, p 110), a desire to enable members to service debt-a  supply factor-may  affect
the volume of IBRD loans. 8
A similar conceptual difficulty in separating supply and demand factors arises also in the case of
IDA.  The IDA does not intermediate funds; instead it receives contributions from donors and lends to
recipient countries.  Because of the highly concessional terms, IDA loans are largely supply-determined.
However, the allocation of IDA funds are guided by "need" and country policy performance. 9
8 See  World  Bank 2000a,  Section  VI "World  Bank Finances",  and also  Gilbert  and Vines  2000,  chapters  1
and  2 for a detailed  description  of World  Bank  financial  structure.
9 As Easterly  (1999) points  out, a typical  model  used for aid allocation  in multilateral  institutions  is based
on the investment-savings  gap-or  "need"-as  implied  by Harrod-Domar  growth  models. Birdsall,  Claessens  and
Diwan  (2001) found  that aid allocation  in the HIPC was marked  by defensive  lending  and non-selectivity--i.e.,
countries  with larger debt burdens received more aid than those with better policies-again underscoring  the
importance  of the external  financing  gap.
9In the rest of this section, we present empirical results for IBRD lending commitments using
aggregate data over the last two decades, and panel data for 30 major IBRD borrowers for the period
FY1987-99. Following that, we estimate a variation of equation (1) for IDA lending commitments using
aggregate data as well as a panel data for 44 IDA borrowers.
3.  1. Data
Data  for  World Bank lending are  obtained from the  Finance Complex of  the World Bank
(FINCR).  Debt service payments on long-term debt and short-term debt (by original maturity) are taken
from the World Bank's Global Development Finance (GDF) database (World Bank 2000b). Data on
international reserves are taken from International Financial Statistics published by the IMF. Country risk
ratings are obtained from the Institutional Investor.  The  10-year US interest rates are from the US
treasury. The Bank's fiscal year runs July-June. The convention followed in the econometric estimation is
to treat calendar year 1999 as comparable to fiscal year 2000 and so on.
3.2. Results on IBRD lending commitments
Table I shows results on total lending commitments using aggregate data for the period FY1980-
1999, and on total lending, adjustment lending and investment lending respectively using panel data for
FY1987-1999. There is no  convenient indicator for country risk rating at the aggregate level, so this
variable is dropped from the analysis of aggregate data.10 In all four regressions, the coefficients of debt
service (LTDS+ST) and international reserves (FR) have the correct signs. Regression (1) shows that
these two variables (along with a dummy for the Asian crisis) explain 79 percent of the variation in IBRD
total lending commitments.
'1  We could  have  used an indicator  such  as EMBI  spread,  but it does  not have adequate  country  coverage,
and  the available  time  series  for  this  variable  is short.
10The coefficient of debt service payments is highly significant (and positive) in the case of LBRD
total commitments (regression 2), but somewhat unexpectedly-considering  that adjustment lending is
more in line with balance of payments support than total lending-  this coefficient is not significant in the
case of adjustment lending (regression 3),"  and its significance level is weaker in the case of investment
lending (regression 4). This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that for financing external gap, a borrowing
country is more interested in the total volume of financing (i.e., adjustment plus investment lending)
rather than its composition. Also, demand for adjustment lending may not arise except in abnormal, crisis-
type situations, since typically (though not always) an adjustment loan from the IBRD is preceded by an
IMF program.  Finally, supply-side guidelines stipulate that the share of adjustment loans, excluding debt
and debt service reduction loans, should not exceed 25 percent of total loans in a fiscal year (World Bank
2000a, p 112): although this is not a rigid guideline and the limit was exceeded after the Asian crisis, it
implies some degree of ad-hoc rationing of adjustment lending at the country level.
The panel data regressions-based  on 30 IBRD borrowers that accounted for over 90 percent of
total IBRD loans in recent years-include  IIR, the Institutional Investor  rating of country risk.  The
coefficient  of this  variable is  found  to  be  significant and  negative,  reflecting that  higher country
creditworthiness implies better market access and less demand for IBRD lending. This is consistent with
the counter-cyclical  behavior of IBRD lending noted earlier.
The coefficient of the interest rate variable (INT) is not significantly different from 0  in the
aggregate results reported in table 1, but it is found to be positive and significant in the panel data results
"  A regression  similar  to (1) in table 1 using IBRD adjustmnent  lending  commitments  as the dependent
variable  yields  a lower  adjusted  R 2 (65 percent)  than  in regression  (1).
11on total lending and investment lending.' 2 Once again, this underscores the counter-cyclical  nature of the
demand for IBRD lendig: when interest rates are low, global liquidity is high and private funding may be
available to IBRD borrowers, resulting in a decline in the demand for IBRD loans.
Although not shown in the tables, we found that these results are broadly unchanged when first
difference of  explanatory variables  are added to  equation (1);  or when  we  regress IBRD lending
commitments normalized by (LMIC) GDP against the ratio of long-term debt service to exports, the ratio
of reserves to short-term debt, risk rating, the US interest rates and a dunmmy  for Asia.  When we regress
IBRD net flows normalized by GDP against the same set of explanatory variables, the coefficients are
again found to have the expected signs, although some are now not statistically significant.
Validation  with out  -of-sample  forecasting
We carried out another robustness check of the results by examining the predictive power of the
model specified in equation (1). We obtained FY2000 (i.e., calendar 1999) data on debt service from the
Global Development Finance 2000, and on international reserves from the World Bank's SIMA database,
and assumed that the Asian crisis was over (i.e., the dummy for Asian crisis is assumed to be  0 in
FY2000). We then predicted IBRD commitments for FY2000 by applying the estimated coefficients from
regression (1) of table I to these explanatory variables.
The model predicts a sharp decline in IBRD lending to $13.9 billion in FY2000 (figure 5).  The
main reasons behind this drop are: a) a sharp increase in the level of international reserves of low-and-
middle-income  countries in response to a turn around in their current account from a deficit of $31 billion
12Note that  the panel data  regressions  are based  on a shorter  sample  period  (FYI  987-99)  than  the aggregate
results  (FY1980-2000).  This  is because  the coefficient  of INT changes  sign,  and becomes  positive  and significant  in
the latter  period.
12in 1998 to a surplus of $10 billion in 1999; and b) a decline in short-term debt as some large borrowers
during the crisis-such  as Korea-rescheduled  part of their short-term debt to longer term maturities.
The predicted level of IBRD lending commitments in FY2000 at $13.9 billion is still higher than
the realized lending amount of $10.9 billion. The difference can be attributed to a  number of factors
including political transitions in Indonesia, Argentina, Jordan and Morocco; conflict and sanctions in
India and Pakistan; and poor performance in Ecuador, Russia, Ukraine.  Besides, this model focuses on
the demand side alone and ignores "supply side" factors.
3.3. Results on IDA lending commitments
To test whether our model of demand for Bank lending also applies to IDA loans, we estimated a
slightly modified version of equation (1).  Since most IDA countries do not have access to international
capital markets-and  IIR is not available for these countries-we  excluded this variable from equation
(1).  We also replaced the dummy for Asian crisis by a dummy for fiscal 1997 during which IDA lending
declined sharply, apparently owing to internal  reorganization in the Bank (World Bank 1998). Results
using aggregate data for the period FY1982-2000 and a panel data set (consisting of 44 IDA countries) for
the period FY1980-1999 are summarized in table 2.
Once again, these results confirm the hypothesis that the level of IDA lending commitments is
positively related to the debt service payments and negatively to the level of  international reserves. A
strong positive  relationship  between  concessional aid  flows and  outstanding debt  (or  debt  service
payments) has been observed by several studies in the literature,  although in a somewhat narrower context
of the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).' 3 Birdsall and others (2001) analyzed 35 countries in
13 Note that this literature  relates to concessional  aid flows to a subset of poor countries. To our
knowledge,  the present study is the first to show a correlation  between  non-concessional  IBRD loans and debt
service  payments  in middle-income  IBRD-eligible  countries.
13Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1977-98  and found evidence of defensive or forced lending-i.e.,  new
lending from creditors (in particular, the IMF in the  1988-98 period) for the purpose of financing the
service due to them. Based on a data set of 18 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1975 through 1995,
Devarajan, Rajkumar and Swaroop (1999) found that one-third of aid goes towards repaying the principal
on past loans (see also UNCTAD 2000, Killick and Stevens 1997, Claessens and others  1997).  The
finding in Collier and Dollar (1999) that aid tapers in when the macroeconomic policy environment is
bad-for  example, during a crisis-and  tapers out when the policy environment improves is also broadly
consistent with the positive association between aid flows and  debt  service payments, and  negative
association  between aid flows and the level of intemational reserves.
4. Conclusion
Econometric analyses of aggregate data as well as panel data reveal  that a  large part of the
variations in IBRD and IDA lending commitments over the last two decades are explained by variations
in debt service payments (including long-term and short-term debt) and the level of intemational reserves.
Countries seem to demand more World Bank lending when their debt service payments increases, and
when their international reserve position declines.  And this is true not only during the recent crisis
episodes, but also during tranquil times over the last two decades. To a lesser extent, investor confidence
and global liquidity conditions-represented  by  Institutional Investor country risk rating and the US
interest rates respectively-are  also found to influence the demand for IBRD lending.
These results indicate that resource transfer remains a dominant consideration behind borrowing
from the World Bank. Also such borrowing tends to be counter-cyclical. These results may not surprise
those familiar with the pleas for "positive net flows" from borrowing countries, or to those familiar with
instruments such as Debt and Debt Service Reduction Loans and Sectoral Adjustment Loans which are
14directly related to debt service payments of borrowers. (See World Bank 2000c for a description of IBRD
and IDA lending instruments.)
These results do not rule out defensive or forced lending-which  has been noted in the context of
HIPC in Birdsall et al. (2001)-by  which some parts of new lending may have been committed to simply
avoid defaults on past IBRD or IDA debt. However, defensive lending may have been less significant in
the context of IBRD loans: Although preliminary results indicated that the amortization due on past IBRD
loans had a  significant influence  on the aggregate level of new IBRD lending, such evidence from
analysis of panel data was not statistically significant at the country level. This is understandable in
middle income countries such as Argentina, Korea or Thailand where debt service payments on IBRD are
quite small, and yet, large IBRD commitments were made following the recent financial crisis. Thus, it
appears that the overall supply of IBRD lending is guided by "positive net flow" considerations, which is
then allocated to different countries according to the financing gap.
Short-term, counter-cyclical borrowing from the Bank during a crisis is consistent with the Bank's
role as a lender of last resort, and also its core objective of fighting poverty in a manner similar to the
effects of humanitarian aid in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Bank lending even during a crisis may
lead to reforms, and an improvement in the policy and institutional environment with a time lag (Ratha
2001).
However, borrowing from the Bank to fill "the financing gap" in general and to service debt in
particular may not be entirely consistent with the Bank's long-term poverty reduction objective. To make
a lasting impact on growth and poverty in a recipient country, Bank loans combined with conditionality
should be able to increase investment "even more than one-to-one" (Easterly 1999).  Yet, if Bank loans
are used for debt service payments, its impact on investment is almost certain to be less than one-to-one.
This may in part explain Easterly's (1999) finding that the aid-investment relationship failed to be greater
than one in 82 out of 88 aid-recipient countries during the period 1965-95. Such lending may also create
15incentives  for borrowers  to delay reforms  necessary  for growth  and poverty  reduction  (Easterly  2000,
Svensson  2000).
Such  borrowings  also violate  selectivity  by which  official  assistance  is allocated  to countries  with
good  policies  (Birdsall  et al. 2001).  For example,  if Bank  lending  has an impact  on growth  and poverty  in
a good macroeconomic  policy  environment,  a marginal  dollar of loan  is better spent not during  a crisis,
but only after stabilization  has been achieved  after a crisis.  This argument  has been made forcefully  by
Collier  and Dollar  (1999),  and Collier  (2000)  in the context  of concessional  aid flows  to poor countries:
Based  on the Burnside  and Dollar  (1997)  finding  that aid is more  effective  in a good  policy  environment,
aid should  "taper  in" after  a crisis;  yet, in reality,  it tends  to "tapers  out".
The finding  that even investment  lending commitments  are related to debt service payments
implies  that aid fungibility  noted in the context  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  in Devarajan  and Swaroop  (2000)
may  be more  widespread  than previously  believed.  If Bank  lending  is fungible  and there is no guarantee
that a particular  Bank loan is financing  an identified  investment  project  or program,  there is a case  to be
made for greater  use of programmatic  lending  (with well-defined  conditionality).  Also,  since financing
needs are bound to increase  in future  as developing  economies  become  larger, and more integrated  with
volatile  international  capital  markets,  there is likely to be a greater  need for fast-disbursing,  contingent
program  lending  facilities  from the World  Bank.
Our  results  also have  some implications  for the debate  surrounding  the delineation  of the roles of
various  multilateral  institutions. If a short-term  resource  transfer  motive  has a significant  influence  on
developing  countries'  desire  to borrow  from the Bank, it would be difficult  for the Bank  to refrain  from
providing  short-term,  counter-cyclical  liquidity  support,  and focus exclusively  on long-term  structural
programs,  as has been  suggested  by some  authors  (Lerrick  1999,  Summers  1999).
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FY00Table  1: Results  on IBRD commitments
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dependent variable:  log(IBRD/GDP)  log(IBRD/GDP)  log(IBRDadj/GDP)  log(IBRDinv/GDP)
(Aggregate  data)  (Panel data)  (Panel data)  (Panel data)
C  -0.792*
(-1.8)
log((LTDS+ST)/GDP)  0.622***  0.674***  0.120  0.346*
(3.6)  (4.0)  (0.5)  (1.81)
log(FRIGDP)  -0.898***  -0.097  -0.233*  -0.137
(-6.8)  (-1.2)  (-1.7)  (-1.6)
Institutional  Investor  .0.  -. 034***  -0.043***  -0.014
Rating  (-3.8)  (-3.2)  (-1.3)
INT  -0.003  0.204***  0.05  0.176***
(-0.2)  (3.9)  (0.4)  (3.0)
Dummy for the Asian  0.310***  0.415***  0.540**  -0.168
crisis (FY98-99=1,  0  (3.2)  (2.8)  (2.0)  (-1.0)
otherwise)
Adjusted  R-squared  0.72  0.49  0.50  0.39
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.7  2.1  1.6  2.1
No. of observations  20  272  97  262
Sample  FY1980-99  FY1987-99  FY1987-99  FY1987-99
Regression (1) shows results from aggregate  data, whereas (2)-(4) show those from panel data. In (1), LTDS, ST, FR and
GDP refer to the respective variables of  low- and middle-income  countries. Panel data regressions include fixed effects,
but these coefficients are not reported. The panel includes 30 IBRD countries for the sample period mentioned under each
regression. T-statistics in parentheses, estimated using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard error. *  *  and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
The panel consists of annual time series data for the period FY1987-99 for 30 major IBRD borrowers: Algeria, Argentina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazhakstan, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines,  Poland, Rornania,  Russia, Thailand, Tunisia,  Turkey, Ukraine
and Venezuela.
26Table 2: Results  on IDA commitments
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dependent  variable:  log(IDA/GDP)  log(IDA/GDP)  log(IDAadj/GDP)  log(IDAinv/GDP)
(aggregate  data)  (panel  data)  (panel data)  (panel  data)
C  -1.12
(1.5)
Log((LTDS+S7)/GDP)  0.692***  0.712***  1.189***  0.307***
(2.9)  (6.2)  (3.8)  (2.9)
log(FRIGDP)  -0.428***  0.023  -0.149*  0.076**
(-3.2)  (0.6)  (-1.7)  (2.4)
INT  -0.027  0.020  0.217***  0.017
(-0.9)  (1.1)  (4.2)  (1.0)
Dummy for FY97  -0.470***  -0.698***  -0.828***  -0.289*
(-3.2)  (-3.1)  (-2.4)  (-1.7)
Adjusted  R-squared  0.70  0.28  0.24  0.33
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.6  2.0  2.2  2.0
No. of observations  19  569  246  540
Sample  FY1982-2000  FY1980-1999  FY1980-1999  FY1980-1999
Regression (1) shows results from aggregate data, whereas (2)-(4) show those from panel data.  In (1), LTDS, ST, FR
and GDP refer to the respective variables of  low-income  countries. Panel data regressions include fixed effects, but
these coefficients are not reported. The panel includes 53 IDA-only and "blend" countries. T-statistics in parentheses,
estimated using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard error. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 100/s  levels respectively.
There are 44 countries in the IDA panel: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Yemen, Zambia.
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